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THE EFFECT OF RECENT MEDICAID
DECISIONS ON A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT:
ABORTIONS ONLY FOR THE RICH?
I. Introduction
In three concurrent but separate class action suits,' the United
States Supreme Court decided that a state's refusal to pay expenses
incident to nontherapeutic abortions neither contravened Title XIX
of the Social Security Act,2 nor contravened equal protection of the
laws. In each of the three suits indigent women sought injunctive
1. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe,
432 U.S. 519 (1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-97(f) (1970 and Supp. V 1975). Title XIX establishes a Medical
Assistance program (commonly known as Medicaid) which enables participating states to
provide federally funded medical assistance to eligible persons. The federal Medicaid pro-
gram creates two groups of needy persons: (1) the "categorically needy," which includes
recipients of federal welfare programs for dependent children (42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (Supp. V
1975)), the aged, blind, and disabled (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)) and (2) the "medically
needy," which includes people who have too many resources to qualify for welfare, but who
have dependent children or are aged, blind or disabled within the meaning of the welfare laws.
(Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)). Participating states are not required to extend Medicaid coverage to
the medically needy. Pennsylvania and Connecticut are among the states that have chosen
to do so. 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2207 (Sept. 29, 1973); see also 432 U.S. at 440 n.1; Connecti-
cut Welfare Department Public Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275 (1975); 432
U.S. at 465-66.
The Medicaid statute requires participating states to provide qualified individuals with
financial assistance in five general categories of medical treatment: 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(1)-(5).
(1) inpatient hospital services ...
(2) outpatient hospital services;
(3) other laboratory and x-ray services;
(4) (A) skilled nursing facility services . . . for individuals twenty-one years of age or
older
(B) . ..early and periodic screening and diagnosis . . . and such health care, treat-
ment, and other measures to correct or ameliorate defects and chronic conditions
discovered thereby,
and (C) family planning services and supplies furnished (directly or under arrange-
ments with others) to individuals of childbearing age (including minors who can be
considered to be sexually active) who are eligible under the state plan and who desire
such services and supplies;
(5) physicians" services furnished by a physician . . . whether furnished in the office,
the patient's home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing facility, or elsewhere.
See 432 U.S. at 440 n.2.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that "[nlo State shall . ..deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphasis added).
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and declaratory relief from statutes and regulations denying them
Medicaid subsidy for their desired elective abortions.' Each plaintiff
clearly met all the financial requirements for Medicaid assistance.5
However, regulations in each of the states afforded financial assis-
tance only to indigent mothers whose abortions were certified as
"medically necessary" by a panel of physicians.' Since these same
states provided financial assistance to indigent mothers for medical
expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth,7 plaintiffs alleged
the abortion certification requirements contravened Title XIX and
the fourteenth amendment.
In Beal v. Doe, the Court held that the Social Security Act does
not require the states to provide Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic
abortions.' In Maher v. Roe, the Court further specified that the
equal protection clause does not require a state participating in the
Medicaid program to subsidize the expenses of nontherapeutic
abortions even though it pays for the medical expenses relating to
childbirth.' Finally, in Poelker v. Doe, the Court found that the
equal protection clause does not compel municipal hospitals to
make their facilities available for elective abortions even though
they are made available for childbirth. 10
This Note will trace the development of abortion decisions since
Roe v. Wade" and Doe v. Bolton,2 and discuss the issues left unan-
swered by those landmark decisions, namely, must public hospitals
now permit the use of their facilities for abortions, and are states
obligated to pay for abortions for women who cannot afford them?
4. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 441; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 467; Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
at 519.
5. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 441; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 467; Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
at 519-20. See also Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 542 (8th Cir. 1975) and the federal require-
ment in note 16 infra.
6. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 441; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 466; Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d
at 543.
7. 432 U.S. at 441-42, 466, 520-21.
8. 432 U.S. at 447.
9. 432 U.S. at 465-66.
10. 432 U.S. at 521.
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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II. Background
A. Medicaid Legislation
Congress enacted Title XIX of the Social Security Act-com-
monly referred to as Medicaid-in 1965.1'. The Medicaid program
is a state-administered plan designed to pay the costs of medical
care for most welfare recipients and certain other poor individuals."
The program is funded by the federal and state governments.15
States are not required to participate in Medicaid, but if they
choose to do so, they must comply with the federal statutes and
regulations which govern the program."6
Arguably, federal payment for nontherapeutic abortions might be
required under the Medicaid benefits allotted for physicians' serv-
ices, inpatient or outpatient services.17 Generally, however, plain-
tiffs in the cases discussed herein sought Medicaid subsidy for abor-
tion under the physicians' services provision. 8
In 1972, the Medicaid statute was amended to include family
planning services,'9 but the amendment did not specifically mention
abortion. Since abortion was not expressly excluded, the court of
13. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-87, tit. I, § 121(a). 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(d) (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(d) (Supp. V 1975)).
14. For an overview of the Medicaid program, see Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current
Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 Clearinghouse Rev. 7 (1974).
15. The federal government provides between 50% and 83% of the funds, depending on
state income. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d) (Supp. V 1975).
16. See note 2 supra. The preamble to Title XIX requires states to assume the costs of
medical assistance for those whose "income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396. States wishing to restrict Medicaid pay-
ments claim that abortions not necessary to protect life or health fail to meet this standard.
Although the Social Security law requires states to subsidize medical costs to the categori-
cally needy, a majority of states participating in the Medicaid program have opted to further
subsidize the medically needy. It is clear that any service offered to the medically needy must
also be offered to the categorically needy. This is the so-called "comparability requirement."
Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (Supp. V 1975). Therefore, arguably, if the state chooses to finance
abortions for medically needy women, by law it must also subsidize abortion costs for categor-
ically needy women.
17. See note 2 supra.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1),(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). The
federal statute stipulates that such treatment shall be covered "whether furnished in the
office, the patient's home, a hospital or a skilled nursing facility, or elsewhere." Id. §
1396d(a)(5). The services of a physician performing an abortion if licensed by the state would
appear to fall squarely within the bounds of medicaid coverage.
19. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 299E, 86 Stat. 1462, amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a) (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1975)).
20. See S. REP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1972).
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appeals in Beal inferred that when Congress extended Medicaid
coverage for family planning, it intended such services to be in-
cluded."2While the Beal, Maher and Poelker cases were pending before the
Supreme Court, Congress further complicated resolution of the pub-
lic funding issue by enacting, over presidential veto, the Hyde
Amendment to the appropriations bill funding the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and the Department of
Labor for the fiscal year 1977.2 This appropriations "rider" limits
federal payments for abortion to cases "where the life of the mother
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. ' ' 3
B. Abortion: A Qualified Constitutional Right
In the landmark decisions of Roe v. Wade24 and Doe v. Bolton, 25
the Supreme Court first held that women have a constitutional right
to decide whether to have an abortion. However the right to an
abortion is a qualified right counterbalanced by the state's legiti-
mate interests in maternal health and the potentiality of human life
in the latter two trimesters of the mother's pregnancy.2 1
In Roe v. Wade, petitioner challenged Texas statutes making it a
crime to perform an abortion unless it was necessary to save the
mother's life.Y The Supreme Court held that the right to an abor-
tion was encompassed within the fourteenth amendment's concept
of personal liberty. 8 Moreover, the Court found that right to be
21. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 622-23 (3rd Cir. 1975). The court drew its inference in light
of congressional treatment of abortion in other laws prior to adoption of the Hyde amend-
ment. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 299f(b)(8) (Supp. V 1975) where
Congress specifically excluded abortion from family planning services when it enacted this
legislation.
One might argue that abortion is not a family planning service, since it is remedial rather
than preventive and thus not the best method for regular family planning.
22. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418. See 122 CONG. REC. S17,304,
H11,860 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976).
23. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439 § 209, 90 Stat. 1434. The use of the "rider"
is arguably an inappropriate vehicle for substantive policy legislation because it runs counter
to Congress' own procedural rules and does not afford committees the opportunity to investi-
gate and analyze the amendment's impact. See 122 CONG. REc. H8632 (daily ed. Aug. 10,
1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug). The act terminated on September 30, 1976 but was renewed
for one more year in a similar appropriation rider. See note 61 infra.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
26. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
27. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 1191-94 & 1196.
28. 410 U.S. at 153.
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"fundamental," thus requiring the state to prove a "compelling
state interest" 9 to regulate the right during the first trimester of
pregnancy." Wade held that the abortion decision during this pe-
riod should be left solely to the woman and her attending physi-
cian." However, during the second trimester the state's interest in
the woman's health predominates over her freedom of choice allow-
ing it to regulate the abortion decision." During the third trimester,
the state's interest in regulation reaches a "compelling point" at
which time the state may impose even more stringent medical pre-
cautions for the health of the mother and may even protect the
potentiality of human life itself.3
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, the Court used its preced-
ent in Wade to invalidate a Georgia law regulating abortions.34 Doe,
29. See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1972) for detailed discussion of the compelling
state interesttest versus the rational basis test:
To be consistent with equal protection [fourteenth amendment], a classification
must rest upon some difference that bears a reasonable relation to the act in respect
to which the classification is proposed . . . .[A] classification, by its nature, sets off
a group affected by special burdens or benefits that do not apply to 'all persons.' The
very idea of classification is that of inequality ....
There are two types of case [sic] where the mere showing that it is rationally related
to legitimate governmental objective is not enough to sustain a challenged classifica-
tion. The first is the case where the classification impinges on a fundamental constitu-
tional right, such as the right to travel interstate."
Id. at 288-91 (footnotes omitted).
The second is the case where the classification impinges on a suspect class such as race. This
type of classification is inherently unreasonable no matter how reasonably it may seem to be
related to a proper public purpose. In both of these cases, the classifications will be held to
deny equal protection unless justified by a compelling governmental interest. This is a stricter
standard to meet than the rational basis standard. Id.
30. 410 U.S. at 162. In fact; the Supreme Court said that a state never has a compelling
interest during the first trimester to regulate a mother's abortion decision.
31. Id. at 163-64.
32. Id. at 164-66. The Court said that although the state cannot override that right, it has
a legitimate interest in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of
human life. Each of these interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages
of the woman's approach to term.
33. Id. The Wade Court expressed a concern for the high mortality rate at illegal "abortion
mills." Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing the Court's opinion, stated that the state's original
interest is in protecting the woman's health rather than preserving the embryo. Id. at 150.
The Court added that during the last trimester, a state may actually proscribe abortion
except when necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother, Id. at 163-64.
34. GA. CODE § 26-1202 (1975), formulated by 1968 Ga. Laws 1249, 1277-1280. The
Georgia law prohibited abortions except as performed by a duly licensed Georgia physician
who determined that continued pregnancy would injure the woman's life, the fetus would
likely be born with a serious defect, or the pregnancy resulted from rape. The law also
required that the patient be a resident of the state and that the abortion meet the following
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an indigent pregnant woman, was denied an abortion because, inter
alia, she failed to meet Georgia's requirement that her attending
physician and a reviewing panel of physicians certify that her con-
tinued pregnancy would injure her life.35
The Supreme Court held that Georgia statute unconstitutional as
violative of the fourteenth amendment." According to the Court,
the review committee's procedure of certifying abortions before they
could be obtained did not advance legitimate state interests in ma-
ternal health. Furthermore, the same requirements were not im-
posed on patients requesting similar surgical and medical proce-
dures.3" Therefore, the committee unduly restricted a fundamental
right without first establishing a compelling state interest.3 8
III. Medicaid Coverage for Nontherapeutic Abortion:
Beal v. Doe
Having judicially created a new right of abortion in the Wade and
Bolton decisions, 9 the Supreme Court was presented with a host of
issues attendant to the new right." One of those issues was whether
procedural conditions: (1) the abortion was to be performed in a hospital accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (J.A.C.H.); (2) the procedure must have
been approved by the hospital staff's abortion committee; and (3) two other licensed physi-
cians had to confirm the performing physician's judgment.
35. 410 U.S. at 185. See GA. CODE § 26-1202(a) (1975). Doe attacked both the provision
requiring a reviewing committee and the statute limiting the hospitals in which abortions
could be performed to those accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi.
tals (JACH). The latter requirement prevented her from obtaining an abortion in a local
clinic. 410 U.S. at 185-86.
36. Id. at 199.
37. Id. at 198-99.
38. Id. The Bolton Court sidestepped petitioner's last argument challenging the statute's
discrimination against the poor. The Court held that by striking down Georgia's accredita-
tion, approval and confirmation requirements, the equal protection argument did not have
to be decided. Id. at 200-01. In so holding, the Court left the discrimination issue open, to be
confronted four years later in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
39. See part 11(B) supra.
40. After Wade and Bolton, states were attempting to qualify the right to abortion by
imposing certain prerequisites on a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy. Some of the
prerequisites compelled women to obtain a physician's certificate that their fetuses were not
viable; some required that their husbands consent to the abortion; and some insisted that if
the mothers were unmarried minors, that their parents consent to the procedure. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court held that requiring parental
or spousal consent would give a second party veto over the woman's constitutionally protected
personal right to choose abortion. Therefore, any such state regulation would be unconstitu-
tional according to Wade and Bolton. However, the Court held that states could require a
physician to certify that the fetus was not viable before aborting it. Such a state regulation
NOTES
there existed a corresponding right to receive Medicaid assistance
for the procedure particularly when it was nontherapeutic. Federal
district and appellate courts had reached varying conclusions.
Immediately following the Wade and Bolton decisions, the United
States District Court for the District of Utah held that the Utah
statutes4 restricting state Medicaid subsidy to medically necessary
abortions were constitutionally invalid.4" In Doe v. Rampton, the
Utah district court concluded that a "[s]tate may not so use its
Medicaid program to limit abortions" because it would limit the
exercise of the right to an abortion by the poor in all trimesters "for
reasons having no apparent connection to [the] health of the
mother or [the] child."4 Thus, the Utah court impliedly held that
Medicaid funding and the right to choose abortion were inseparable.
The limitation on funding of the procedure would exact the same
result as the limitation of the right.
In Roe v. Ferguson," pregnant welfare recipients45 challenged an
Ohio statute48 prohibiting the use of state or local funds to pay for
abortion unless the medical procedure was necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother. Appellants charged that the statute
contravened Title XIX of the Social Security law. 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in 1975 that there was no indica-
tion that Congress, in Title XIX, intended to fund abortions not
required to preserve the health of the pregnant mother.48
One year prior to the Beal decision, the United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire pronounced its solution to
the Medicaid funding issue in Coe v. Hooker.4" In Coe, indigent
would help enforce the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of life. Id. at 52.
41. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-302(3), 303-11, 313-19 (1953).
42. Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
43. Id. at 193.
44. 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975).
45. The indigent mothers were joined in this class action by physicians performing abor-
tions for the welfare recipients, clinics where the abortions were performed and the National
Organization of Women. Id. at 280.
46. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.55(c) (Page 1977).
47. 515 F.2d at 280.
48. Id. at 283. The Sixth Circuit, using the same language as the Supreme Court did in
Beal, stated that it was "reluctant" to infer that intent. However, the Sixth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court for a full hearing and discussion on whether the state regulations
violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 283-84.
49. 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976).
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women ° sought to terminate their pregnancies in the first trimester.
Their abortions were not necessary to preserve their lives or health
or that of the fetuses. Plaintiffs were refused Medicaid reimburse-
ment for their abortions5' even thoughNew Hampshire's regulations
provided for "Medicaid benefits for full-term deliveries and other
pregnancy related medical care.""
The Coe court determined that since the New Hampshire statute
extended Medicaid assistance to all pregnancy care except elective
abortions, it violated Title XIX of the Social Security law.53 The
court gave two reasons for its construction of the Social Security
Act. 4 First, Title XIX essentially mandates equal'treatment and
coverage of the "categorically needy" 5 receiving Medicaid bene-
fits56 Second, states are forbidden from arbitrarily denying Medi-
caid benefits to an eligible individual. 7
The court squarely held that abortion was an alternate treatment
of the medical condition of pregnancy. The court stated that "if
New Hampshire offers medical services for the care of pregnancy,
it may not unreasonably and arbitrarily restrict a Medicaid pa-
tient's choice of treatment.""8 Furthermore, the Coe court de-
nounced the state for making a legal decision on moral grounds,
stating that "[m]oral judgments are not 'reasonable standards'
under the law." 59 By using the equality and arbitrariness tests, the
50. None of the plaintiffs had sufficient means to pay for an abortion, but each was
eligible for Medicaid assistance at the time. 406 F. Supp at 1078.
51. Id.
52. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 161:4 I (Supp. 1975).
53. 406 F. Supp. at 1084. The court held that by statute Congress had guaranteed Medi-
caid recipients equal treatment by state Medicaid administrators.
54. Id. at 1080.
55. See note 2 supra.
56. 406 F. Supp. at 1083-84. The court went on to cite 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (1970).
"[Tlhe medical assistance made available to any individuals described in clause (A)(i) shall
not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance made available to any
other such individual .. " Id.
57. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(B)(i) (1970). See 45 C.F.R. 249.10(a)(5)(i) (1977).
58. 406 F. Supp. at 1086. The court said that since the state already covered the costs of
pregnancy rare for Medicaid recipients, it could not unreasonably exclude abortion as an
eligible service under Title XIX. Such exclusion would be an arbitrary denial of Medicaid
benefits to eligible individuals.
59. Id. at 1083. The district court felt that the New Hampshire Medicaid program was
an attempt by the state to impose its own brand of morality on its constituents. According
to the district court, the Wade and Bolton decisions stand for the principle that a state may
not infringe upon a woman's right to obtain an abortion simply because the state opposes
the procedure on moral grounds.
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New Hampshire court struck down the state's Medicaid plan.
Finally, in McRae v. Mathews0 indigent pregnant women peti-
tioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York to enjoin the application of the Hyde amendment"' on
grounds that it was unconstitutional under Wade and Bolton. The
district court stated that the freedom to choose an abortion, al-
though technically unaffected by the act, was an "unreal" right if
indigents could not receive Medicaid subsidy for exercising their
right. The McRae court added that needed medical assistance was
denied solely because the woman chose to exercise a constitutionally
protected right. 3
Against this background of lower court decisions, the Supreme
Court decided to resolve the Medicaid issue in Beal v. Doe." The
Beal respondents, eligible under Pennsylvania's plan, were denied
financial assistance for abortions pursuant to the state regulations.
The Pennyslvania Medicaid plan limited assistance to those abor-
tions that were certified by physicians as medically "necessary. ' 5
60. 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
61. See notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text supra. Although the Hyde amendment
to the Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and Labor Departments' appropriations bill
prohibited the use of federal Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions, it does not change
the Medicaid statute itself. Congress, acknowledging that Beal, Maher and Poetker were
pending before the Supreme Court, noted in its report that ". . . its action upon this particu-
lar appropriations bill [did] not intend to prejudge any constitutional questions involved in
those cases." H.R. REP. No. 1555, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
On December 7, 1977 the House of Representatives and the Senate renewed the Hyde
amendment in a more liberalized form. The new law, again passed as a rider to the yearly
appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, allows
federal Medicaid funds to subsidize both abortions for physically ill women and certain
medical procedures to terminate pregnancy for some incest and rape victims. The compro-
mise is likely to set a pattern for state legislation on the controversial subject, although it
appears unlikely that it will satisfy either those opposing abortion or those who support freer
access to abortion. Both factions vowed a continued fight when the bill is up for renewal in
1978. Tolchin, Compromise is Voted by House and Senate in Abortion Dispute, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
62. 421 F. Supp. at 542.
63. Id.
64. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
65. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 441.1-442.1, 3 Penna. Bulletin 2207, 2209, Sept. 29, 1973. The
challenged restrictions were regulations of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.
They required that two physicians concur in writing that the abortion is necessary. Further-
more, they provided that abortions were compensable only when:
(1) there is documented medical evidence that continuance of the pregnancy may
threaten the health of the mother;
(2) there is documented medical evidence that an infant may be born with incapacitat-
19781 695
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The Court addressed the issue of whether Title XIX required
Pennsylvania to fund, under its Medicaid program, the cost of all
abortions that were permissible under state law. The Beal Court
held that the state's refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nonther-
apeutic abortions was not inconsistent with either the language or
the purpose of the Social Security law."6 Thus the Court indirectly
overruled the lower court interpretations in Rampton, Coe and
McRae, and impliedly approved the Ferguson holding.
First, the Court emphasized that Title XIX makes no reference
to abortion. 7 However, this is not unusual. Title XIX does not single
out any particular medical procedure. Instead, it merely outlines
general service categories such as physician, inpatient and outpa-
tient services. The Medicaid statute merely requires a state's med-
ical assistance plan to include a "reasonable standard" for deter-
mining eligibility and the extent of assistance, and requires that the
standard be "consistent with the objectives of this [Title]."6 In-
deed, such language confers broad discretion upon states in their
adoption of standards to determine the extent of Medicaid cover-
age.70 In applying such a broad test, the Supreme Court rejected the
stricter Coe interpretation of equality of treatment and arbitrariness
of classification. 7'
ing physical deformity or mental deficiency; or
(3) there is documented medical evidence that a continuance of a pregnancy resulting
from legally established stautory or forcible rape or incest, may constitute a threat to
the mental or physical health of a patient; and
(4) two other physicians chosen because of their recognized professional competency
have examined the patient and have concurred in writing; and
(5) the procedure is performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals.
Id.
66. 432 U.S. at 446-47. The Court asserted that the language of Title XIX, the state
purpose involved, and the HEW regulations interpreting the Social Security law all supported
its conclusion.
67. Id. at 444.
68. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(17) (Supp. V 1975). The Medicaid statute has a dual purpose: to
furnish medical assistance to families with dependent children and to those aged, blind, or
permanently and totally disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient
to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and to help such individuals attain or retain
capability for self care.
Furthermore, Bolton noted that factors which the physician should consider when deter-
mining whether an abortion is necessary include the woman's age, as well as her physical,
emotional, psychological and familial well-being. 410 U.S. at 192.
70. 432 U.S. at 444.
71. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
NOTES
Pennsylvania's regulations reflected its policy of encouraging
childbirth by subsidizing expenses incident thereto, while refusing
to subsidize elective abortion procedures. The Beal Court deter-
mined that this was a permissible exercise of Pennsylvania's discre-
tion within the parameters of Title XIX.72 In so holding, the Court
recognized the state's valid and important interest in promoting
childbirth.73 Although that interest cannot justify state interference
with a woman's constitutionally protected choice to obtain an abor-
tion, the Court said that the state's interest is sufficient to regulate
Medicaid payment throughout the course of a woman's pregnancy.74
Furthermore, the Court stated that it would not presume that Con-
gress intended to condition a state's participation in the Medicaid
program on its willingness to forego this state interest.7 5
Responding to the charge that Pennsylvania's statute discrimi-
nated against the poor, the Court explained that Pennsylvania did
not obstruct the pregnant woman's path to abortion. Rather, the
medical profession created the money hurdle by requiring payment
for its services.7" A woman still possesses the fundamental right to
obtain an abortion. 7
The encouragement of childbirth and a moral opposition to abor-
tion may indeed be two sides of the same coin. A state could camou-
flage a moral opposition to abortion in its Medicaid statute by
claiming that it is merely exercising its recognized interest in en-
couraging childbirth. Perhaps the Supreme Court is saying that a
state may base its decision on whether to subsidize elective abor-
tions purely on moral grounds, thus departing from the holdings in
the Wade, Bolton and Coe cases.78 Furthermore, the theoretical
right to choose whether to obtain an abortion may, in practice,
never reach fruition if an indigent mother desiring such a procedure
cannot pay for it.
72. 432 U.S. at 444.
73. Id. at 445-46.
74. Id. at 446.
75. Id. at 446-47.
76. See note 102 and accompanying text infra.
77. 432 U.S. at 446.
78. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
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IV. Application of the Equal Protection Clause to State
Medicaid Plans (Maher v. Roe"9)
Having rejected the statutory claim,80 the Court was obligated to
reach the constitutional issue that restricting Medicaid assistance
for nontherapeutic abortions constituted a denial of equal protec-
tion. In Bolton, the Supreme Court had side-stepped petitioner's
argument that the Georgia statute discriminated against the poor
and thus violated equal protection of laws.' Following the Bolton
decision, it was in doubt whether states which subsidized childbirth
expenses through their Medicaid plans were now required by the
fourteenth amendment to subsidize nontherapeutic abortions.
One year after Bolton, indigent pregnant women challenged a
policy established by the executive director of the Utah Department
of Social Services" that only therapeutic abortions 3 would be subsi-
dized through the state's Medicaid program. In Doe v. Rose, 4 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that such restriction
unduly limited the exercise of the right to an abortion in all trimes-
ters, for reasons having no apparent connection to the health of the
mother or child. 5
Utah's directive failed to meet either the compelling interest or
rational basis tests." The court concluded that the policy invidi-
ously discriminated against indigent abortion candidates by effec-
tively limiting abortions on moral grounds. 7 Moreover, Rose held
that the Utah restriction denied an indigent medical assistance un-
79. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
80. Since the statute is sufficiently vague in construction, the statutory argument easily
could have been decided either for or against the respondents in Beal. However, the Court's
interpretation of the statute necessarily leads to a complete discussion of the equal protection
argument in Maher v. Roe.
81. See note 38 supra.
82. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Rose said that although the policy was
not reduced to writing, it was followed by the Utah State Department of Social Services. 499
F.2d 1112, 1113 (10th Cir. 1974).
83. "Therapeutic abortions" were defined as those necessary to save the life of the mother
or to prevent serious or permanent impairment of her physical health. Id. at 1117.
84. 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 1115 (emphasis added). The court would not allow this limitation on such a
surgical procedure once a state has already undertaken to provide general short-term hospital
care funding similar procedures. Id.
86. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that since the costs of childbirth were far greater than
abortion expenses, the policy could not pass the rational basis test. See note 29 supra.
87. 499 F.2d at 1117.
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less she relinquished her freedom of choice and bore the child." The
court noted that the policy discriminated against the indigent
mother by reason of her poverty and by reason of her behavioral
choice. Conditioning the receipt of statutory entitlement upon for-
feiture of fundamental constitutional rights (commonly called the
"unconstitutional conditions doctrine") was, according to the court,
prohibited by due process of law.89
In the same year as the Rose decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit faced a similar equal protection claim in
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health. 9 0 The
medical center challenged Illinois regulations requiring that de-
tailed records be kept concerning abortions and their recipients. The
Seventh Circuit voided the regulations, holding that the fundamen-
tal right to an abortion requires that the right be free of all govern-
mental regulations that have an effect on the abortion decision, at
least during the first trimester."
Having decided the statutory claim in Beal, the Supreme Court
attempted to put to rest the controversy over the equal protection
issue. In Maher v. Roe, 2 two indigent women who were unable to
obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity, brought an
action attacking the validity of a Connecticut Welfare Department
regulation 3 which limited state Medicaid assistance for first trimes-
88. Id.
89. This theory was established in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), wherein the
Supreme Court invalidated a state's refusal to provide unemployment benefits to a woman
whose religious beliefs forbade her to work on Saturday. The Court held that conditioning
receipt of unemployment compensation on the beneficiary's agreement to work on Saturday
would require her to forfeit her first amendment right to free exercise of religion and was thus
unconstitutional. The "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" is usually couched in equal
protection terms, as in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U..S. 250 (1974), where the
Supreme Court struck down an Arizona regulation conditioning medical benefits to the indi-
gent on a lengthy residency period. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967),
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See also Comment, Another Look at Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144 (1968).
90. 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
91. Id. at 1151. The Seventh Circuit concluded that only general health regulations that
would not be burdensome on a woman's right to decide to abort a pregnancy would be
constitutional. Id. at 1154.
92. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
93. Connecticut Welfare Dept. Public Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. HI, § 275.
Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The [Welfare] Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical
Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions are met:
19781
700 FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. VI
ter abortions to those that were "medically necessary." Appellees
contended that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment requires states to subsidize nontherapeutic abortions through
their Medicaid programs for women eligible for Medicaid."
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
had held95 that the equal protection clause forbids the exclusion of
elective abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsi-
dizes medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth." Fur-
thermore, the court found that "abortion and childbirth, when
stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion
controversy, are simply two alternate medical methods of dealing
with pregnancy .... '7
The Supreme Court reversed the three judge district court," hold-
(1) In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medically necessary. The
term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric necessity.
(2) The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or licensed clinic when
the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy ....
(3) The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, and in the case
of a minor, by the parent or guardian.
(4) Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of Medical Services,
Division of Health Services, Department of Social Services.
Id. See 432 U.S. at 466 n.2.
94. 432 U.S. at 466.
95. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (three-judge court), rev'd sub nom.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
96. Connecticut originally defended its regulation on the theory that Title XIX of the
Social Securities Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically necessary.
The district court in Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974), held that the Social
Security Act not only allowed state funding of elective abortions but required it. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Title XIX allowed but did not mandate
the funding of nontherapeutic abortions. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975). The case
was then remanded to a three-judge district court.
97. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 n.3 (D. Conn. 1975), citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Relying on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the district court held that the
Connecticut regulation dissuaded the pregnant mother from exercising her "constitutionally
protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion, thus infringing upon a fundamental right. 408
F. Supp. at 663-64.
98. 432 U.S. at 464. As with all other equal protection claims the crucial question was the
applicable test. If the Court found the presence of a suspect classification or fundamental
constitutional right, a "compelling interest" test would apply. This would mean almost
certain victory for the plaintiffs since the state would be able to impose its restrictions on
abortion only if it could prove it had a compelling state interest in doing so. However, if the
Court found neither of those factors it could apply a "rational basis" test. This would spell
almost certain doom for plaintiff's claims.
For a more complete discussion on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
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ing that the case neither involved discrimination against a suspect
class nor impinged upon a fundamental right." The Court stated
that financial need alone does not identify a suspect class for pur-
poses of an equal protection analysis. 10 A suspect classification
based on wealth arises when an indigent is totally deprived of a state
furnished commodity because of his inability to pay a state-imposed
fee. '' The Court noted that, in the instant case, private physicians,
requiring fees for their abortion services, rather than the state, im-
posed the money hurdle. 02
The Maher Court also held that the indigent appellees had a
and the applicable tests, see Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949); see generally Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analy-
sis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605 (1973). See also San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) ("We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates
to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny . . . . If
not, the [legislative] scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therfore does not constitute an invidi-
ous discrimination. ... Id., cited in 432 U.S. at 470).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 470-71.
101. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-22. For cases where the
courts have found a suspect classification based on wealth because of an indigent's inability
to pay a state imposed monetary hurdle, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971). In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), the Court refused to extend the
Boddie rule to a bankruptcy filing fee.
It might be argued that the rule delineated in Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, would govern
if the state monopolized the means of obtaining an abortion. However, imposing on states
the absolute responsibility to pay a physician to perform an abortion is substantially different
from requiring states to waive fees they would otherwise collect as was done in Boddie. It
would create an affirmative duty to pay a third party to provide a service. Extending this
logic to its extreme, states would be required to pay for all medical care for all residents
because some can afford to purchase it from state-licensed providers. Such would establish a
judicial national health insurance law. The courts have not gone this far.
102. 432 U.S. at 474. See note 76 and accompanying text supra. In so emphasizing, the
Court has retreated from its previous statement in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976),
that "[flor a doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing, and a woman who cannot afford
to pay him, the State's refusal to fund an abortion is as effective an 'interdiction' of it as
would ever be necessary." 428 U.S. 118-19 n.7. In Singleton, two Missouri-licensed physi-
cians brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief from a Missouri statute, Mo.
REv. STAT. § 208.151-208.158 (Supp. 1976), excluding abortions that were not "medically
indicated." It must be noted, however, that in Singleton, the Supreme Court did not pass
on the constitutionality of the Missouri statute. Rather, the Court ruled only that the physi-
cians had standing to challenge the state regulation and remanded the constitutional question
to a lower court.
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fundamental right only to an abortion and not to reimbursement for
the medical expenses incurred in connection therewith. 0° Thus, the
Court stated that the Connecticut regulation placed no obstacles in
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion."4 Having created no
obstacles, the regulation did not impinge upon the fundamental
right recognized in Wade and Bolton.
The Court analyzed the decision whether or not to have an abor-
tion as if it were made in a vacuum. 105 Certainly, a crucial factor in
making that decision is whether the indigent woman will receive
Medicaid reimbursement. A state policy which withholds payment
not only influences the decision, but in many cases determines it.
Since payment is not a fundamental right, according to the Court,
the state may withhold the necessary funds. Thus, the present law
seems to be that a woman has a fundamental right to have an
abortion without state interference; but such a right in the absence
of a state subsidy, is all but meaningless.
The Court cited Meyer v. Nebraska' and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters'"7 as authority for establishing a difference between direct
state interference with a protected activity and state encourage-
ment of an alternate activity.0 8 In Meyer, the Court held that the
state had the power to prescribe a curriculum which included Eng-
lish and excluded German from its public schools.0 9 Similarly, ac-
cording to the Maher Court, ". . . Pierce casts no shadow over a
State's power to favor public education by funding it" and not sub-
sidizing private and parochial education." Meyer and Pierce repre-
sent state encouragement of an alternate activity which according
to the Maher Court is perfectly reasonable."' Thus, the Maher
103. 432 U.S. at 473-74.
104. Id. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
105. Id. at 474. In fact, the Court realized that by not funding elective abortions a state
does indeed influence the mother's decision. But as long as the state does not create an
obstacle in the path of making that decision, such regulations, according to the Supreme
Court, do not infringe upon the fundamental right. The Supreme Court stated that "[aln
indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connect-
icut's decision to fund childbirth. Id.
106. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
107. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
108. 432 U.S. at 476-77.
109. 262 U.S. at 402-03.
110. 432 U.S. at 476-77.
111. Id. at 476. On the other hand, the Supreme Court also cited Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), as
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Court held that a state does not have to show a compelling interest
to support its policy favoring childbirth any more than a state must
justify its decision to fund public but not private schools." 2
The Court in Maher held Connecticut to the much less rigorous
rational basis test."3 That test requires only that the state rationally
justify the distinction between childbirth and elective abortions."'
The Supreme Court, in many abortion decisions, has discussed the
depletion of the public fiscl" and the health of the mother in decid-
ing whether disparate treatment met the rational basis test."' But,
expenses incident to childbirth, which would be reimbursable under
Medicaid, far exceed the cost of an abortion."7 The Court has also
pointed out that carrying the pregnancy to a properly executed de-
livery is far more detrimental to the mother's health than a properly
executed abortion performed during the first trimester of preg-
nancy."' Thus, there is clearly some doubt about whether these
considerations would be sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the ra-
tional basis test.
In fact, the Court in Maher cited other reasons to justify the
disparate treatment. It held that Connecticut had a "strong and
legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth" and that the
Connecticut regulation furthered that goal.' It concluded that sub-
sidizing the costs incident to childbirth was a rational means of
cases in which states have overstepped their bounds by interfering with a protected right-the
right to travel. In Memorial Hospital, the Court struck down a residency requirement estab-
lished by the hospital for all non-emergency services. 415 U.S. at 269. In Shapiro, the Court
held as unconstitutional a state residency requirement needed to collect welfare funds. 394
U.S. at 462.
112. 432 U.S. at 477.
113. Id. at 478. See note 29 supra.
114. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) for an example of the application of the
rational basis test.
115. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972). A state may refuse to offer
a service for this reason.
116. However, in the instant case, both factors were favorable to the appellees' challenge.
Therefore, had the Supreme Court applied the usual tests for determining whether the state
had met the rational basis test, the result might have been different.
117. The New York Times reported the latest HEW estimate for 1977 that maternity costs
for welfare mother, plus pediatric fees for her baby's first year, plus public assistance funds
from federal, state and local governments add up to $2,200,. whereas the average abortion
costs are between $150-200. Dullea, Supreme Court Ruling Sparks Moves to Halt Medicaid
Abortions, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1977, § 3 (Family/Style), at 32.
118. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 445.
119. 432 U.S. at 478, citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 446.
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encouraging childbirth.'20
Finally, the Court emphasized that Congress can legislate to pro-
vide Medicaid benefits for such abortions if it wishes.' 2' Maher also
reiterated that states are free to choose whether to fund elective
abortions through their own Medicaid programs. 2 Thus, the Su-
preme Court impliedly overruled both Rose and Friendship Medical
Center. 23
V. Restricting Providers of Medicaid Abortions (Poelker v.
Doe 2
4)
Medicaid is a vendor payment program designed to reimburse
providers of health care for services rendered to program beneficiar-
ies.'25 It will pay for services if the proposed recipient can locate
someone who will provide the desired treatment. Because of increas-
ingly burdensome administrative procedures for obtaining payment
and because of past and present disparities between fees paid by
Medicaid and those paid by private patients, many providers refuse
to treat Medicaid patients. 2 '
In Poelker v. Doe, '2 the Supreme Court allowed city officials to
120. Id. at 479.
121. Id. at 480.
122. Id.
123. Having decided Maher, the Court acted quickly to reverse the grandfather of Medi-
caid abortion cases, Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, vacated sub nom. Toia v. Klein,
97 S. Ct. 2962 (1977), and remanded to the district court for further considerations in light
of Beal and Maher. In Klein, a New York law forbidding Medicaid reimbursement for elective
abortions was twice successfully challenged. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 365a(2) (McKinney 1976)
and administrative letters 71PWP-17 and 72PWP-27 issued by the New York State Commis-
sioner of Social Services dated April 8, 1971. See 347 F. Supp. 496, 497-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, in 1972 and again in
1976, had held that a statute or rule attempting to deny or interfere with a woman's choice
of whether to bear a child infringes upon her fundamental right to an abortion. 347 F. Supp.
at 500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); 409 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Moreover, the district
court had found that it was a denial of equal protection to prohibit Medicaid assistance for
legal abortions to indigent women who otherwise qualify for Medicaid. 409 F. Supp. at 733.
Facing facts similar to those in the instant cases, the Supreme Court vacated Klein and
remanded that case to the district court for further consideration in light of its decisions in
Beal and Maher. Klein v. Nassau County Med. Center, vacated sub nom. Toia v. Klein, 97
S. Ct. 2962 (1977).
124. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (Supp. V 1975).
126. See Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial
Interpretations, 8 Clearinghouse Rev. 7, 14-15 (1974).
127. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
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remove city financed hospitals from the provider market. The
Poelker decision overturned two prior circuit court decisions. In
Nyberg v. City of Virginia,' 8 physicians and indigent pregnant
women challenged the constitutionality of a municipal hospital res-
olution which prohibited use of hospital facilities for nontherapeutic
abortions.' The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit required
that the hospital take cognizance of separate trimesters in its regu-
lation of abortion. Since the, hospital resolution did not do so, it
was held to be overbroad and invalid.' 3 Furthermore, the court
stated "[iut would be a nonsequitur to say that the abortion deci-
sion . . . [is] to be made by the physician and his patient without
interference by the state and then to allow the state . . . to effec-
tively bar the physician from using state facilities to perform the
operation."' 3' The court concluded that the hospital's administra-
tion could not "arbitrarily preclude abortions from the variety of
services offered which require no greater expenditure of available
facilities and skills. '' 32
In Doe v. Hale Hospital, 33 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit approved of the Nyberg result by holding that a public med-
ical facility may not forbid elective abortions so long as it offers
medically indistinguishable procedures.' 3 The Hale court held that
it is not necessary to proscribe abortion in order to contravene the
Wade and Bolton decisions. It is sufficient to create barriers which
"unduly restrict" the rights of women.' 35
In Poelker, the last of the abortion trilogy, the Supreme Court
took the Beal-Maher rationale one step further. Doe, a pregnant
mother of two, challenged a policy directive issued by the Mayor of
St. Louis, Missouri which prevented her from obtaining an abor!;.
128. 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
129. Resolution No. 2606, Feb. 5,1973, Virginia Municipal Hospital, Minnesota. See 495
F.2d at 1343.
130. 495 F.2d at 1345-46.
131. Id. at 1346.
132. Id. The court stated that its decision would not require a hospital to establish new
or different facilities and staff in order to perform the operation. Id. at 1345.
133. 500 F.2d 144 (lst Cir. 1974).
134. Id. at 147. The court added that this would violate the fundamental right associated
with the decision to terminate pregnancy. The First Circuit said that it was indisputed fact
that the hospital already permitted use of its facilities for medical procedures in the same
general area of medical practice as abortions, exposing the patient to greater risk in some
instances and imposing a greater demand upon the hospital's resources. Id.
135. Id. at 146, citing Bolton, 410 U.S. at 198.
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tion. 3 The directive, a memorandum from the Mayor to the Direc-
tor of Health and Hospitals, prohibited the use of city hospital
facilities for performing abortions unless the pregnancy threatened
grave physiological injury or death to the mother.'37
The Court held, in light of Maher, that the St. Louis policy pro-
viding publicly financed hospital services for childbirth, while not
financing services for elective abortions, did not violate the four-
teenth amendment.'38 The Supreme Court explained that the
Mayor's policy of denying city funds for abortions should be ap-
proved or disapproved of at the polls.'
Poelker permits cities to close their hospital doors to abortions for
rich and poor alike, 4" thus impliedy overruling both the Nyberg'
and Hale Hospital decisions. Therefore, an additional obstacle is
now placed in the woman's path to abortion-that of searching for
a private hospital or clinic.4 2
136. 432 U.S. at 519. Doe had had five prior miscarriages and was presently suffering from
cervical fibroid tumors and polyps and an extremely retroverted uterus. 515 F.2d 541, 542-43
(8th Cir. 1977). However, she could not obtain a doctor's certification justifying that an
abortion would save her from grave physiological injury or death. Thus, she was forbidden to
obtain an abortion from the local city-owned and operated Max C. Starkloff Hospital. Id.
The hospital's medical employees were staffed exclusively from the affiliated medical
school of St. Louis University, a Jesuit institution. The mayor's directive disallowed all
elective abortions from being performed at the hospital unless the abortions were necessary
to save women from "grave physiological injury or death." Id. at 543. Furthermore, if Doe
had sought to obtain her abortion from a private clinic, the city would have denied medical
assistance through its Medicaid plan unless she met those requirements. However, the city
offered Medicaid subsidies to all indigent mothers who chose to bear their children. Id. at
545.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit required that all city-owned facilities be made
available for such abortions and held that the city had a "duty" to obtain services of responsi-
ble physicians whose views on abortion did not prohibit them from performing such a proce-
dure. Id. at 546. The Supreme Court reversed. 432 U.S. at 520-21.
137. 432 U.S. at 520. It is noteworthy that the mayoral directive was promulgated by
Mayor John H. Poelker several months after the Supreme Court abortion decisions of Wade
and Bolton were announced on January 22, 1973. 515 F.2d at 543 n.3.
138. 432 U.S. at 521.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 522-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. In 1974, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from the Nyberg decision. 419
U.S. 891 (1974). The decision in Poelker, which effectively overruled Nyberg, indicates a
change of heart on the part of the Supreme Court.
142. A recent survey suggests that the effects of the decision in this case will be felt most
strongly in the rural areas, where the public hospital will in all likelihood be closed to elective
abortions, and where there will not be sufficient demand to support a separate abortion clinic.
Sullivan, Tietze and Dryfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States (1975-1976), 9 Family
Planning Prospectives 116, 121 (1977).
Less than three months after the Supreme Court decided Poelker,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin in Doe v. Mundy' extended the Supreme Court rationale to
include medically necessary or therapeutic abortions. In Mundy,
plaintiffs sought an injunction and declaratory relief against the
policy of Milwaukee County General Hospital (MCGH) precluding
the hospital from performing abortions unless the continuation of
the mother's pregnancy threatened her life. " '
Plaintiffs argued that the requirement was so restrictive as to
deny abortions which by Supreme Court standards would be termed
medically necessary.' The district court held that the Supreme
Court in its abortion trilogy had not "restricted its decisions to the
upholding of regulations allowing abortion based on medical necess-
ity."'46 In fact, the court squarely stated that "Beal, Maher, and
Poelker declared no constitutional violation in the failure to provide
funding for medically necessary abortions . . . .[Therefore,] the
county may choose to fund the medical aspects of childbirth and
decline to fund the performance of any abortion which is not re-
quired because of a threat to a woman's life imposed by continua-
tion of her pregnancy.' ' 47
The Wisconsin court in Mundy utterly disregarded the Supreme
Court's finding in Beal that "[a]lthough serious statutory ques-
tions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded neces-
sary medical treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent
143. 441 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
144. 441 F. Supp. at 448-49. MCGH's rule 26(b) provides in pertinent part that
"[piregnancy may be terminated therapeutically if it is complicated by medical conditions
of such nature and advanced to such degree that continuation of pregnancy threatens the life
of the mother." MCGH redefined the terms "elective" and "therapeutic." The hospital's
rules stated that elective abortions referred "to any abortion proscribed under rule 26(b)"
while therapeutic abortion is one permitted under the rule. JPMS, p.2, 1 and 2, 441 F.
Supp. at 449.
145. In Beal, an abortion was defined by regulation as medically necessary when preg-
nancy could threaten a woman's health, when it resulted from rape or incest and would
constitute a threat to a woman's mental or physical health and when an infant would possibly
be born with a mental deficiency or physical deformity. 432 U.S. at 441 n.3. In Maher, the
regulation provided a subsidy for medically necessary abortions which included psychiatri-
cally necessary abortions. 432 U.S. at 466 n.2. In Poelker, the mayoral directive prohibited
the performance of abortions in city hospitals except when there was a threat of physiological
injury or death to the mother. 432 U.S. at 520. In Mundy, the MCGH rule only allowed
abortion if continued pregnancy threatened the mother's life. 441 F. Supp. at 447.
146. 441 F. Supp. at 451.
147. Id. at 452.
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with the objectives of the [Social Security] Act for a State to refuse
to fund unnecessary-though perhaps desirable-medical serv-
ices."14
This strong dictum suggests that the Mundy decision should be
overruled. Having decided the fate of nontherapeutic abortions, the
Supreme Court might very well have to decide whether states may
now refuse to subsidize any medically necessary abortions other
than those required to preserve the mother's life.
VI. Conclusion
In Wade and Bolton the Supreme Court clearly said that states
may not infringe upon a woman's right to obtain an abortion simply
because the state opposes the procedure on moral grounds. In Wade,
the Court held that prior to the end of the first trimester, the abor-
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the pregnant
mother in consultation with her attending physician.14' The Wade
Court stated that although the state has a legitimate interest in
protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality
of human life, those interests reach a "compelling point" during the
last two trimesters of the woman's pregnancy."' Until those inter-
ests reach that "compelling point," the state cannot override the
abortion decision or its effectuation.
Four years later, the Supreme Court has effectively undercut its
prior decisions by declaring that a state may limit funding for elec-
tive abortions. Limiting Medicaid reimbursement for nontherapeu-
tic abortions may pose an insurmountable obstacle to the indigent
woman's ability to effectuate her abortion decision.
In Maher, the Court stated that obtaining an abortion was effec-
tively a two-stage process. In the first stage, a woman, without
considering her financial situation, decides to terminate her preg-
nancy. In the second stage, she determines how to pay for it. The
Supreme Court has held that the state is only prohibited from inter-
fering with stage one. Stage two can be regulated by the states.
Such reasoning is questionable at best. Given the soaring costs of
medical care, many decisions to seek abortions will be contingent
upon reimbursement. The Medicaid funding issue is inextricably
148. 432 U.S. at 444-45.
149. 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
150. Id. See notes 29-33 supra.
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bound to the right to exercise a choice to obtain an abortion. Limit.
ing the funding effects the same result as limiting the actual right,
at least insofar as indigent women are concerned. It is unrealistic
to believe that an indigent woman can make a valid choice if she
knows she will be deprived of the means to effectuate her choice.
However, if she chooses to follow the state-encouraged morality and
bear her children, she will be reimbursed not only for her pre-
delivery and delivery expenses but also for her children's post-natal
costs and will later receive an increase in her welfare stipend.
To be consistent with equal protection, a state's separate classifi-
cation of abortion candidates in a state's Medicaid plan has to rest
upon some rational basis.'5' Having held that the abortion decision
is a two-stage process, the Court then said that states have a valid
interest in encouraging childbirth throughout the entire term of the
pregnancy, thus satisfying the rational basis test.'52 The state inter-
est was applied to limit the second stage or the financing stage of
the abortion decision process.' 3 Thus, the Court cautiously avoided
overruling Wade and Bolton.'5' According to the Supreme Court,
states may validly encourage childbirth by denying Medicaid fund-
ing for abortions, but states may not proscribe the theoretical right
to an abortion. Arguably, the state policy of encouraging childbirth
and the state opposition to abortion on moral grounds are opposite
sides of the same coin. In effect, the Supreme Court may now allow
public morality to curtail the effectuation of the abortion right.
The Poelker decision, even more dramatically than Beal and
Maher, curtails the Wade and Bolton holdings since it not only
refuses to honor the differing rights arising out of each trimester of
pregnancy as laid out in Wade and Bolton, but it closes off one more
channel to abortion-public hospitals-for the rich and poor alike.
151. See note 29 supra.
152. The usual criteria employed in a rational basis analysis in abortion cases is preserv-
ing the public fisc and the health of the mother. However, it has been clearly established that
.expenses incident to childbirth are much higher than those incident to abortion. Seenote 117
supra. Also, there is less danger in obtaining a proper medical abortion early in one's preg-
nancy than in carrying the pregnancy to term. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
Therefore, had the Court used only these criteria, the results would have supported the
conclusion that states have no rational basis for not funding nontherapeutic abortions.
153. The state interest, according to Wade, could not interfere with a woman's right to
seek an abortion. However, the Supreme Court in the abortion trilogy segregated the theoreti-
cal right to choose abortion from the practical decision of how to pay for one.
154. See notes 149 & 150 and accompanying text supra.
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In many rural areas, public hospitals are the only hospitals in the
near vicinity.'55 Moreover, privately owned hospitals may refuse to
treat Medicaid patients for abortions for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding religion, red tape and lower fee schedules.' Thus, private
institutions are not the ideal substitute for publicly financed hospi-
tals. In short, the abortion trilogy allows cities and states to achieve
indirectly what they are prohibited from achieving directly-the
proscription of nontherapeutic abortions.'57
Michael A. Lalli
155. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
157. The Court held that states may, if they wish, extend medical coverage for elective
abortions. 432 U.S. at 447. However, it is questionable whether states will enact such legisla-
tion, since, pursuant to Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), states desiring to extend Medicaid assistance for
elective abortions could not condition the medical benefits on a residency period. Therefore,
any state funding nontherapeutic abortions would be faced with indigent residents from
neighboring states, which had not extended Medicaid coverage, drawing abortion funds from
its treasury.
